Recent works have independently suggested that quantum mechanics might permit procedures that fundamentally transcend the power of Turing Machines as well as of 'standard' Quantum Computers. These approaches rely on and indicate that quantum mechanics seems to support some infinite variant of classical parallel computing.
H -the question whether a given TM M eventually halts or rather continues executing indefinitely-cannot be decided by any TM M 0 . Notice that, according to Definition 1.1., this hypothetical M 0 is required to always give the correct answer and to terminate. More precisely, the difficulty inherent to the Halting Problem consists in telling within finite time whether M does not halt; for, simply simulating M step-by-step, M 0 can easily identify the case when M does terminate.
Turing's result initiated the flourishing field of Computability or Recursion Theory (Odifreddi, 1989) . Its goal is to distinguish computable from uncomputable problems and to classify the latter according to their degree of uncomputability (Soare, 1987) . For example, the following celebrated result of Matiyasevich has settled Hilbert's Tenth Problem in the negative by proving it equivalent to H :
Theorem 1.2. (Matiyasevich (1970)) On the one hand, a given description of a Diophantine Equation E (like Fermat's famous "a
n + b n = c n " for a, b, c, n ∈ N) can computably be transformed into a TM M such that it holds: M terminates iff E admits an integral solution.
On the other hand, a given TM M can computably be converted into the description of a Diophantine Equation E in such a way that, again, M halts iff E admits an integral solution.
Apart from the TM, many further sensible notions of computability have been proposed: e.g., µ-Recursion (which gave the field its name), Herbrand-Gödel-Computability (which led to the programming language Prolog), and λ-Calculus (which stipulated Lisp). But they were all shown equivalent to the TM by Church, Kleene, Post, Turing, and others; cf. e.g., Odifreddi (1989, Chapter I) or Atallah (1999, Section 26.3+4) . Even nowadays PCs are still basically just TMs (the processor corresponds to the finite-state control and the infinite tape models the computer's finite but adaptively extendable storage) although very fast ones; recall that we are dealing with problems that cannot be solved computationally at all, neither quickly nor slowly. For the very same reason, (at least 'standard') Quantum Computers are still no more powerful than an ordinary TM (Gruska, 1999, p. 3 , footnote 1).
Church-Turing Hypothesis
It should be stressed that both Halting and Hilbert's Tenth Problem are desirable to be solved for very practical reasons. The first for instance arises in automated software verification; indeed, correctness of a program includes its termination which, by the above considerations, cannot be checked algorithmically.
Similarly, a hypothetical algorithm for deciding feasibility of Diophantine Equations could be applied to computer-proving not only Fermat's Last Theorem but also to settle many other still open questions for example in number theory.
Observing that Turing (1936) and Matiyasevich (1970) ruled out the possibility of a Turing Machine to decide either of these problems, people have since long tried to devise other computing devices exceeding its power. However, the perpetual failure to do so plus the aforementioned results of a TM being able to simulate many other notions of computability have eventually led to what has become known as the Church-Turing Hypothesis:
Anything that can be computed in practice, is also computable by a TM.
We emphasize that, due to its informal nature, this hypothesis cannot be proven formally. Arguments in its favor usually point out that computation is a physical process which, by mathematically describing the physical laws it is governed by, can be simulated by a TM up to arbitrary finite numerical precision; and infinite accuracy were required only for 'chaotic' processes that are too sensitive to perturbations than being harnessable for practical computation anyway.
However, it has later been pointed out that certain theories of quantum gravitation might actually not admit a simulation by a TM (Geroch et al., 1986, p. 546) ; furthermore even classical mechanics seems to conceivably provide for processes whose simulation requires infinite precision during intermediate times only, whereas the resulting behavior is asymptotically stable and thus suited well to realize a non-Turing form of physical computation (Yao, 2003) . Moreover, the laws of nature we know so far seem to restrict (if at all) the performance but not the fundamental capabilities of computation (Bennett, 1985) .
In fact, neither Church nor Turing themselves have put forward a claim as bold as the way 'their' hypothesis is often (mis-)interpreted (Copeland, 1997) . Instead, the literature contains and discusses a rich variety of related hypotheses (Ord, 2002 , Section 2.2).
Hypercomputation
Anyway, the question remains open whether there might exist a computing device more powerful than the TM or not. To get an idea how such a Hypercomputer might look, theoreticians have started considering super-TMs and their respective fundamental computing capabilities. This established the flourishing field of research called 'Hypercomputation' (Copeland et al., 1999) that entire volumes of significant journals have been dedicated to (Calude et al., 2002a; Burgin et al., 2004) . Devising such a formal model (i.e., an idealized abstraction) of a hypercomputer proceeds in many cases less by adding extensions to than by removing restrictions from a TM. Conditions (a)-(e) underlie the mourned limitations of the classical TM, and dropping one or more of them leads to several well-known models of hypercomputation; see, e.g., Ord (2002, Section 3) or Copeland (2002, Section 2) . Oracle machines for instance, subject of Turing's dissertation in Princeton (Turing, 1939) and now core of Recursion Theory (Odifreddi, 1989; Soare, 1987) , correspond to TMs with initial memory inscription, that is, they remove Condition (b); Blum, Shub, and Smale's R-Machine (Blum et al., 1989 , in particular Section 1, Example 6) abolishes Condition (c) by allowing each cell to store a real number; while Infinite Time Machines due to Hamkins et al. (2000) lift Condition (d).
The proposal, consideration, and investigation of such enhanced abstract models of computation and their respective computational powers by logicians and theoretical computer scientists has proven particular seminal regarding related contributions from Theoretical Physics on their realizability. For example, Beggs et al. (2004) has indicated that a physical system breaking Condition (a) might actually exist 2 ; while Hogarth (1992); Etesi et al. (2002) ; Shagrir et al. (2003) pointed out that in General Relativity there might exist 2 space-time geometries allowing one to watch within finite time a computer execute an infinite number of steps and thus to lift Condition (d).
Quantum Mechanical Hypercomputation
Recently, several new approaches have been suggested for solving either the Halting Problem (Adamyan et al., 2004; Calude et al., 2001 Calude et al., , 2002b or Hilbert's Tenth Problem (Kieu, 2003a,b) . They exploit quantum mechanics and thus form a nice counterpart to previous approaches based on General Relativity (Etesi et al., 2002; Hogarth, 1992; Shagrir et al., 2003) as the other pillar of non-classical physics. Recalling that 'standard' Quantum Computing does not exceed Turing's Barrier, these approaches must be non-standard in some sense which closer inspection reveals to be infinite parallelism:
• "Our quantum algorithm is based on [. . . ] (Calude et al., 2002b, p. 123, Section 5) . It thus seems that quantum mechanics allows to drop Condition (e) from Observation 1.3 and so to provide a new promising approach to the existence 2 of hypercomputers-an approach not included in Ord's classification (Ord, 2002 , Section 3). The present work describes in Section 2. the theoretical consequences from lifting Condition (e), that is the computing power of infinite parallelism.
We conclude this section with an already announced remark on the notion of existence.
Remark 1.4. The question whether a physical device with certain properties exists bears logical similarity to the question whether a mathematical object with certain properties exists. In the latter case for a proof, only very few (namely constructive or intuitionistic) mathematicians will (A) insist that one actually constructs this object whereas most are satisfied for instance with (B) an indirect argument showing that its non-existence leads to a contradiction.
In fact a majority of contemporary mathematicians will even take it for granted if (C) the object's existence does not lead to a contradiction. For example, the claim "For every vector space there exists a basis" is of kind (C) as are many principles in Functional Analysis: Each of them is equivalent to the Axiom of Choice (Blass, 1984) and thus does not lead to a contradiction to conservative set theory (C) but cannot be deduced from it (B) as has first been proven by K. Gödel in Gödel (1940) and later strengthened by P. J. Cohen.
Similarly, the existence of a physical object can be proven in a strong way (A) by actually constructing it. But in most cases, showing it (C) consistent with physical laws is accepted as well. Observe that this is how both positrons and black holes came into 'existence': As solutions of (and thus consistent with) Dirac's Equation and Einstein's General Relativity, respectively; only later have new experimental observations upgraded our conception of their existence.
INFINITE PARALLEL COMPUTING
The prospering field of Parallel Computing knows and has agreed upon a small collection of models as theoretical abstractions for devising and analyzing new algorithms for various actual parallel machines (Atallah, 1999, Sections 45.2 and 47.2) . Of course with respect to their principal power, that is computability rather than complexity, they are all equivalent to the TM.
However, when talking about infinite parallelism, seemingly no such agreement has been established, cf. e.g., Eberbach et al. (2003, p. 284) ; and in fact no equivalence, either, as it will turn out. For instance, of what kind are the countably infinitely many individual computers that are to operate concurrently-TMs or finite automata? In the first case, do they all execute the same program? When is the result to be read off? The answers to these questions fundamentally affect the capabilities of the resulting system.
Infinite Cellular Automata
Consider parallelism in an infinite cellular automaton in the plane. More specifically, we refer to Conway's famous Game of Life (Berlekamp et al., 2004, Chap. 25) where in each step, any cell's successor state concurrently is determined by its present state as well as those of its eight adjacent ones' as follows (cf. Fig. 1 ):
• A dead cell with exactly three neighbors alive becomes alive, too; otherwise it remains dead. • A living cell with two or three neighbors alive stays alive; otherwise (0,1,4 . . . 8 living neighbors, that is) it dies. 
Proof:
Life is easily programmed on a Turing Machine, for example by beginning with the source code for one of the many correct implementations of Life available on the internet. The converse Claim (ii) is a famous result based on a complicated construction; see, Berlekamp et al. (2004, Chap. 25) for details.
In particular, Life matches but does not exceed the computing capabilities of a TM; cf. Atallah (1999, Section 26.4 (1)). Here, finiteness of the initial configuration enters crucially of course. One can indeed show that infinite initial configurations in (ii) correspond to non-blank memory contents and thus to dropping in Observation 1.3 both Conditions (e) and (b).
Infinite Turing Concurrency
In order to focus on the power obtained from infinite parallelism only (that is, by removing just Condition (e), now consider the finite automata replaced by TMs. Indeed the three citations in Section 1.3. indicate that, whereas Quantum Computing-and in particular simulating a single classical TM (Benioff, 1980 )-requires only a finite (or at most countably infinite) number of dimensions from quantum mechanical Hilbert Space, its infinitely many dimensions provide room for an infinite number of TMs: cf. Hilbert's Hotel.
Strictness of Chomsky's Hierarchy implies that a single TM is provably more powerful than a single automaton (Atallah, 1999, Section 25.3) . One may therefore expect that the capabilities of an infinite number of TMs exceed those of an infinite number of automata (and thus actually lead to hypercomputation); by how much, however, turns out to depend.
In analogy to Definition 1.1., consider first the following notion of solving a problem by means of infinite parallelism. However observe that, whereas each individual M k halts, the time required to do so may depend on k so that it takes infinitely long for the entire family (M k ) k to terminate. (We point out that this behavior resembles the fair infinite nondeterminism of van Emde et al. (1989) .) In order to get the entirety of all their answers within finite time, the following additional requirement is therefore important:
(iii) Upon input of any x ∈ N, all M k terminate within finite time bounded independent 3 of k.
While seeming sensible at first glance, a second thought reveals that, even with this restriction, the resulting notion of 'infinitely parallel computability' is still unreasonable: simply because any problem L ⊆ N becomes trivially solvable by an appropriate family (M k ) k . To this end let the program executed by M k store the constant "1" if k ∈ L and the constant "0" otherwise. Let its main part then operate as follows: Upon input of x ∈ N test whether x = k; if so, output the stored constant, otherwise output "0"; then terminate. Observe that, in accordance with (iii), the test "x = k" can indeed be performed in time depending only on x but not on k by comparing only the inital segments up to the length of x. The trick lies of course in the according family (M k ) k solving L being shown to merely exist. More precisely, (i)-(iii) fail to require that the descriptions of all M k and their constants be computable. Therefore, we finally include this condition as well, in Theoretical Computer Science known as uniformity.
(iv) A TM M 0 is capable of generating, upon input of k, (the encoding of) M k .
Here, encoding refers to a 'blueprint' of M k ; formally: to its Gödel Number (Hopcroft et al., 2001 , Section 9.1.2).
Computational Power of Infinite Turing Concurrency
This section reveals that the Definition 2.3. While H refers to the question whether given TM M, started on a single given input x, eventually terminates, Totality asks whether M halts on all possible inputs. So in contrast to the first, this even more important property of correct software still remains intractable to automated verification even on this kind of hypercomputer. Even more than already in the previous ones, proofs in this section regularly exploit well-known results from Theoretical Computer Science, for conciseness reasons just by indicating according references.
Theorem 2.4. The Halting Problem is solvable by an infinity of TMs working in parallel in the sense of Definition 2.3. (i)-(iv).
Proof: For each k ∈ N, consider the TM M k working as follows: Given M and x, it simulates M operating on x the first k steps of if M halts within these steps, then M k outputs "1" and terminates; otherwise it outputs "0" and terminates. In other words, M k is basically a Universal Turing Machine U ( · ; k) with an additional counter for the number of steps simulated so far in order to abort as soon as this counter exceeds the prescribed threshold k.
Observe that the thus defined family (M k ) k satisfies (i) and (ii) from Definition 2.3. Moreover, since M k is basically U with last argument fixed to k, one easily confirms that (iv) an appropriate TM M 0 can indeed generate from k an encoding of this M k . And finally it is known (Du and Ko, (2000) , Proposition 1.17, p. 25) that the simulation by a Universal TM is possible with at most quadratical overhead, i.e., M k can be achieved to have running time t(n) ≤ c · (n · k) 2 for some constant c; Here, n denotes the length of the input to M k , that is, of the joint binary encodings of x and M. Now let M k be the TM obtained from applying the below Linear Speed-Up Lemma 2.5 to M k with C := k 3 . It follows that M k has running time bounded independent of k, that is, it complies with (iii) while still satisfying (i), (ii), and (iv).
In order to achieve Property (iii) in the above proof, the crucial ingredient is the below classical construction. In analogy to Moore's empirical law of technological progress, it basically says that a TM can be accelerated by any constant factor. Proof: See for instance, Atallah (1999, Theorem 24.5(b) ).
Recall that 'semi-decidability' (also called recursive enumerability) weakens 'decidability' from Definition 1.1. in that, here, the TM is allowed in case x ∈ L to not halt but to loop endlessly (Hopcroft et al., 2001, Section 8.2.5) . By the first (and easy) part of Theorem 1.2, Hilbert's Tenth Problem is semi-decidable. More generally, every semi-decidable problem is the termination problem of an appropriate TM (Soare, 1987, Theorem II.1.2) . Theorem 2.4 thus implies that infinite Turing-Parallelism can solve any semi-decidable L ⊆ N. In fact, the converse holds as well:
Theorem 2.6. A problem L ⊆ N is solvable in the sense of Definition 2.3. (i)-(iv) iff semi-decidable.
Proof: By the above remark, it remains to consider the case that L is solvable by some parallel family (M k ) k according to Definition 2.3. We are going to semidecide L on a single TM by means of the following simulation: Upon input of x ∈ N and for each k ∈ N,
• obtain from M 0 a description of M k by virtue of (iv) • and simulate M k on input x. (Observe its termination according to Property (i)) • If output is "1", halt; otherwise proceed with next k.
This algorithm indeed terminates iff at least one
M k outputs "1", that is (ii), iff x ∈ L.
Corollary 2.7. Even infinite Turing concurrency cannot solve Totality.
Proof: Totality is well-known to not be semi-decidable. More specifically, we refer to (Soare, 1987, Theorem IV.3.2) where this problem is shown to be 2 -complete, that is, [32, Definition IV.2.1 and Corollary IV.2.2] (Soare, 1987) reducible to ∅ (2) ∈ 2 , and therefore does not belong to the class 1 ⊆ 2 of recursively enumerable problems.
CONCLUSION
Section 1 has pointed out that recent and independent approaches due to Kieu, Calude, and Pavlov to hypercomputation via quantum mechanics rely on some sort of infinite parallelism. Regarding the respective complicated intertwined quantum mechanical constructions, procedures, and analyses, we suggest bringing more clarity into this subject by considering algorithmic/computational issues separately from physical ones. This leads to the following two questions to be treated individually:
(1) Does quantum mechanics allow for infinite parallelism; and, if so, of what kind? (2) What kinds of idealized infinite parallelism yield which computational power; that is, does it and by how far exceed the fundamental capabilities of a TM?
Section 2 contains answers to the second question. It reveals that in fact infinite classical (i.e., Turing-) parallelism is sufficient for solving both the Halting Problem as well as Hilbert's Tenth Problem. This leaves open whether the infinite dimensions of quantum mechanical Hilbert Space do indeed allow for this kind of infinite classical parallelism. Specifically,
• preparation of a certain initial state,
• its maintenance (in particular coherence) throughout the computational evolution, and • read-out of the final result are likely to raise here even more difficulties than already in the finite-dimensional case of 'standard' Quantum Computing (Gruska, 1999, Section 7.2) . However (im-)practicality of hypercomputation should not be confused with (un-)existence, particularly in the light of Remark 1.4.
